(TRANSKRIP) Bay of Pigs: Invasion of Cuba — The Failed Battle that Changed Latin America History

So—I know the title is a little bit exaggerated—but more or less, it affected most, though not all, countries of Latin America for the past 60–65 years up to now. I used a cover inspired by an image that was published in LIFE magazine in 1963, and I re-interpreted that cover because one of the things the Brigade didn’t have was a photographer with them. There aren’t many pictures, so I had to use whatever sources I could. One of the things that inspired me: my father, as I told you before, was from Cuba.

Here he is. And many—well, not most, but many—people who studied with him emigrated to Miami and participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion. My father was living in Venezuela at the time, and my sister was being born, so he didn’t get involved.

My family had a farm in Pinar del Río and were neighbors of the Batistas—you know, the dictator of Cuba. Two or three times my aunt—no, this is my grandmother; my aunt went out with Batista’s eldest son. She didn’t like him, but at that time you couldn’t just refuse; she was pressured by my grandmother to get acquainted with them.

We went to the Bay of Pigs Museum, which is being remodeled and expanded right now. I introduced many of them—everyone here and some not in this picture—and I drew inspiration for my main character from Emilio and another one not shown here, Jorge Gutiérrez; they were in the infiltration team. Of course, this is the Wall of Honor. Many of the people on that wall died in Girón—108 to be exact. Afterwards, those who died later were also added to the Wall of Honor. I don’t know how that will look once they expand the museum.

This is the most important part for the most important group—the infiltration group—and these two are the ones who inspired me. He was a very good friend of my father. For the rest of the Brigadiers, they were like the elite. We revered these people: they were the first chosen and the first who started the movement that ended with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Of course, everybody knows that at the beginning that wasn’t the plan. The landing site wasn’t invariably going to be Girón. It was Trinidad, but Kennedy changed the place—and more or less, that change contributed to the failure. Not only the change of the site, but other changes too.

I use this map because two guys—well, they were very well positioned here. The circle should probably be bigger now that we know more. With the failure of the Bay of Pigs, it wasn’t just Cuba; Nicaragua and Venezuela were affected, Colombia with guerrillas, Peru with guerrillas, Chile, Argentina—everyone was affected one way or another by the victory of the Cuban regime and its aftermath.

I’m also trying—no, not trying, I did include in the book—the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs: not just the event but its consequences. Among the consequences: the Cuban Missile Crisis; eventually the assassination of Kennedy—maybe, maybe not related. Many people speculate the Cubans or the CIA were involved or whatever, but I include it in the way I thought might tell the truth, or at least stick close to it.

This is Cuba. This is the Zapata Swamp right here; here’s Havana—it’s not far. The first place they chose for the invasion was Trinidad. Santiago de Cuba is here, Guantánamo Bay here—the American base is right here. Cuba is around 43,000 square miles. The war (the revolutionary war) was in the Sierra Maestra for about two and a half years, more or less. My godfather was a colonel in the Cuban Army and fought against the rebels. He was among the first to leave after Fidel Castro took power. This is a map of Cuba.

At the time Batista left—he fled the country on January 1, 1959—he left a bankrupt state. Fidel Castro wasn’t exactly the only person who overthrew Batista. There were many factors, but Fidel Castro benefitted from it. He became the image, a romanticized figure. He was the most covered person in the entire revolution, so he gained the most from it.

One thing many people said at the time was that Castro and his movement were not communist; in fact, he always said his revolution was “green as the palms”—not communist red. That’s where I took the title for the book: Green as the Palms, but Red as Blood, because in the end he was communist and, in the end, he went after all who opposed him, with all the consequences that followed.

After the revolution, he came to the United States. I don’t regret not being born then, but I regret—as an historian—that Eisenhower did not welcome Fidel Castro. He sent his Vice President, Richard Nixon. Castro resented that he didn’t get what he wanted—money—so he approached the Soviet Union, and of course the Soviets gave him everything he wanted.

At that moment Eisenhower tried to get rid of Castro. That’s when the CIA comes into play. His Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles. When Eisenhower told him to overthrow Fidel Castro, well—you cannot do it directly. The intelligence apparatus had to do it. John Foster Dulles had a brother, Allen Dulles, who was head of the CIA. One thing led to another.

The Dulles brothers are the kind of people we have to study; very interesting figures. They developed a plan. This is the plan they gave Eisenhower, and Eisenhower gave them the green light to proceed.

If you read this—I included all the documents—you’ll see it’s very open and has a lot of loopholes that the CIA exploited. Just a curiosity: every document we know says “Top Secret.” Anyone can read a document labelled Top Secret once declassified. But when it says “Eyes Only,” that means it was for one person in particular. So these were very, very secret documents. They were released 25 years later, and some parts are still redacted.

He approved the plan to get rid of Castro on March 17, 1960. At the beginning, it was a guerrilla-type program. The original name was the Cuban Task Force, then it changed to Operation Pluto—don’t confuse it with another “Pluto” from World War II; this Pluto was the Bay of Pigs operation.

The first part under the Dulles brothers and the CIA was the infiltration teams, and that’s where I got my inspiration. I knew Félix Rodríguez. Here he is—Félix Rodríguez. I interviewed him. He was the one who captured Che Guevara and then ordered his execution. He was one of the original infiltration team—one of the 66 I list.

Their major task was sabotage inside Cuba. Not every Cuban favored the revolution, so the plan was that sabotage would destabilize the country and the people would take control and get rid of Castro. That didn’t happen.

So they began to expand, and the expansion is what became the Bay of Pigs. The infiltration team did not land at the Bay of Pigs; they were already inside Cuba when the invasion began. Recruitment was in Miami; everybody knew something was being planned—maybe not everyone was involved, but everyone knew something was happening. To improve secrecy the CIA chose Guatemala for recruitment and training of the Brigadistas. That was called TRAX Training Camp. It was clandestine, but they were inspired—they were motivated—because they thought if the U.S. backed the invasion, they could deliver Cuba’s freedom.

The name of the movement was Brigada de Asalto 2506. “2506” came later, and the flag was used during the landing. Now that flag is in Miami. The number “2506” commemorates the first Brigadista who died—Carlos Santana—who died in training.

These were two of the trainees—CIA trainees and Brigadistas. I put them both in the book because my main characters track closely with real figures. They were the only Americans who went ashore at the Bay of Pigs—despite Kennedy’s order that no Americans land in the field. They were supposed to pull back before, but they were on the original landing. I read a book—Grayston Lynch wrote a book—and I used it as a reference. Much of what I included during and after is from Lynch’s point of view; I also cross-checked with them. A lot of my main character is based on Frank Sturgis—he’s a very particular character—who trained the pilots for the operation.

The original plan was to land at Trinidad, in the center of the island, not necessarily at Girón. The reason for Trinidad: many people there opposed Castro—not everyone, of course—but many. There are mountains—the Escambray Mountains—so if the plan failed they could retreat there and wage guerrilla war for years. There’s a port and a runway—everything needed for a landing.

E. Howard Hunt—also from the CIA—handled recruitment and obtaining weapons for this covert operation that was not approved by Congress, so it had to be under the table.

But then Kennedy won the election; Eisenhower’s Vice President, Nixon, lost to Kennedy. That changed everything. Even though Kennedy was briefed after the election, every Brigadista holds Kennedy responsible for the failure. He could have retracted—he was president—but he accepted the operation.

They told him to do the invasion before March, because the CIA knew a lot of Soviet ships with weapons were coming to Cuba around March. But Kennedy delayed, then asked for the change because the plan was too loud, too “Eisenhower-style.” So they changed the site to the Bay of Pigs—Playa Girón and Playa Larga—one road in, one road out. If the plan failed, they would have nowhere to run. It’s also nearer to Havana. In effect, they were condemned by that change.

There was a small landing strip there, and the population was very small at the time, but still—the expectation was that whatever the U.S. said, it would back us. The CIA also believed that once they landed the people would rise up and overthrow the government. That’s something every government assumes—but it doesn’t always happen. People are afraid. They did not rise up.

The U.S. had a fleet off Cuba, but 30 miles offshore. They didn’t use it because Kennedy never gave the order for the planes to protect and support the Brigadistas.

One interesting point—and it’s in my book’s subtitle—is the dual naming: Bay of Pigs is the Western version; Playa Girón is the Cuban version. In Miami there are many Cubans who arrived after this event, and the story they tell differs from the story told in Cuba. Conflicting points of view. In any case, the operation started with bombing of the airfields. There were supposed to be three days of bombardment before the landing; Kennedy cut it to one day. They didn’t destroy all the planes, so they did not have air superiority. The planes were the champions of the battle—critical—and they were not neutralized.

After the first bombing was stopped, Fidel started rounding up everyone. They arrested around 50,000 people—known opposition—and among them were infiltration team members already inside Cuba. Many were executed on the spot without trial. Then he stopped the mass executions because it looked bad politically. This man (pointing) was shot at the beginning of the campaign.

The Bay of Pigs invasion took place from April 17 to April 20. It was a continuous, non-stop battle.

Day One:
Two of the five ships went to Playa Girón; the others went to Playa Larga. They tried to land the Brigadistas, but not everyone got ashore. The 5th and 6th battalions didn’t land—one stayed on the ship, one got stuck in the swamp and could do nothing. It’s 35 miles from Larga to Girón—more than a marathon. Not easy to regroup, especially at night. These were volunteers, not all professional soldiers. Landing at midnight was not an easy task. They met some resistance at first, but later…

One thing the CIA didn’t account for: the reef at Playa Larga. When you send landing craft across the reef, many were damaged and sank. Brigadistas had to jump into the water with 70 pounds of gear. Many drowned. The paratroopers, dropping at night, got lost. They eventually regrouped, but the initial chaos delayed their main objectives.

There were around 1,200 Brigadistas; the Cuban forces were around 20,000. The Cubans had tanks, artillery, planes—everything. Fidel wasn’t the field commander there; Raúl was in the east and Che Guevara in the west, coordinating.

The Houston was one of the ships bringing Brigadistas. It was hit by a plane. The captain ran it aground to get as many men off as possible—very brave. Brigadistas jumped into the water to reach the beach; those who didn’t drown were hit by gunfire. Of the 106 who died in the operation, around 15% died on the Houston.

Today there’s a monument at the site. It used to be claimed that Fidel himself fired the shot that sank the Houston, but it was sunk by an airplane. When Castro arrived, the Houston was already sinking.

Another ship—the Río Escondido—was also lost. When two of five ships go down, three turn back. The Brigadistas ended up with only one day’s worth of ammunition, food—everything. Nothing else could be unloaded. They couldn’t last.

Castro sent both professional troops and militia. It’s similar to Venezuela now: when Maduro calls up the militias—they aren’t trained or disciplined; they’re cannon fodder. They died in large numbers. On a stretch called the “road of terror,” the Brigade’s B-26s strafed convoys, killing between 600 and 800 militia in that event alone.

But 65–76 hours later, there was nothing else to do. Admiral Arleigh Burke (one of the top U.S. Navy commanders at the time) wanted Kennedy to send troops from the carrier to save the men on the beach. The order never came. The U.S. would not get directly involved. The order to those ashore was: “Every man for himself.” When you’re in a swamp without food, you try anything to survive. Most were captured. On the 19th, the Cubans won the battle—in 68 hours.

There’s a U.N. guideline: if a rebel group holds territory and has political leadership for more than 72 hours, they can ask for help; then the United States could have entered. They were four hours short of that timeline, so the U.S. did not intervene.

Of course, Castro and Che knew the U.S. was involved and proclaimed this the first defeat of the North American empire. Kennedy later publicly accepted responsibility.

But I didn’t want to stop the book there. It’s divided into three big chapters; the last is “Aftermath.” One aftermath: Castro’s government in 1961–62 was just beginning; it wasn’t seen as fully aligned with either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. The Soviets offered support—and then came the Missile Crisis.

The prisoners were held around 21 months. They staged a mass trial that lasted four days for about 1,200 captured men and sentenced them to 20–30 years—basically 30 years for everyone. My father’s friend got 25 years. Killing them all would have been terrible politics, so they chose long sentences.

Then Bobby Kennedy advised John, and the U.S. felt responsible to get them out. They began to look for a way. Castro knew the U.S. couldn’t give money to another government, but they negotiated: tractors, food, medicine, baby food—in exchange for the prisoners. The key negotiator was James Donovan. If you saw the movie Bridge of Spies, the main character is Donovan. He negotiated the release of the American pilot Powers and—less well-known—the 1,200 Brigadistas and about 5,800 of their family members.

A curiosity: you’ll see photos of Castro with two watches—not Swatches, they were Soviet watches—one set to Havana time, the other to Moscow time. Che also wore two (one on each wrist).

Negotiations overlapped with the Missile Crisis; after the crisis, the prisoners were returned to the United States. Many reunited with family; many went into private life; around 200 joined the U.S. military and served in Vietnam. Some rose in rank—one became a colonel, another a general.

Politically, Kennedy wanted to compensate for the failure and give them a hero’s welcome at the Orange Bowl. They accepted—there was pressure to follow protocol. And the one who stole the show was Jackie Kennedy: she spoke Spanish, and the crowd loved her—even those who didn’t love John loved Jackie.

Here’s a caricature from the time, reflecting how the Bay of Pigs affected Kennedy’s politics—and, eventually, his assassination. I’m not saying they’re causally connected; there are many conspiracy theories linking it to the CIA or Cubans. But it marked Kennedy’s early presidency.

This is the Wall of Honor. Most Brigadistas say Cuba was not lost at the Bay of Pigs; Cuba was lost in Washington—because politics overrode the operation. Kennedy decorated Allen Dulles in November and then, the next day, fired him. Dulles later served on the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy’s assassination—long story.

The aftermath also included Operation MONGOOSE—sabotage and subversion in Cuba for about 25 years. Castro claimed there were 638 attempts on his life. Maybe not that many, but if your life is threatened hundreds of times and you survive, people around you start seeing you as a demi-god, a superhero; it increased his popularity.

I like to end with this image: one man—Fidel—and nine U.S. presidents. Some served eight years. That’s dictatorship; people have to learn to live with the regime.

These are some of the books I read. This one—Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story by Grayston Lynch—is among the best. This one by E. Howard Hunt—he recruited many of the people. This one by Félix Rodríguez—one of the infiltration team who captured and killed Che. This one by Fabián Escalante—the head of State Security in Cuba—so I could see the Cuban point of view. And this one with James Donovan, which explains the negotiations step by step. I used all this to build the book. I tried to bring everything together and be as faithful to the information as possible. The only fictional person is the main character; the rest is historical and as objective as I could make it.

If you would like to—uh—hospital… hey—

Pictures—their photos are amazing pieces of research. The Brigade had no cameramen—no. They had priests—three priests—but not a cameraman. One of the things the U.S. usually focused on, whether in the Battle of the Bulge or at the Normandy landings, was getting cameramen inside to document events. Here, the only images we have are drawings from witness descriptions and photos taken by Castro’s forces. It was very hard to get imagery.

One of Fidel’s commanders—a comandante—was an army officer trained by the United States. He’d been to Houston for training, I think. José Luis Fernández—he became a vice president. He was one of the military experts Fidel had, because during the Batista years he had trained many of Batista’s soldiers.

Yes—most of Batista’s soldiers were U.S.-trained.

And the planes the Cubans used—during Batista, Eisenhower put a military embargo on the regime. He’d become so involved with the mafia, prostitution, corruption that the U.S. stopped selling arms to Batista. The British, being unscrupulous, stepped in and said, “Buy some of ours,” and they used the Sea Furies as fighter-bombers for ground attack.

Yes—the Sea Furies were the ones that sank two of the ships. Most of Cuba’s military equipment before 1959 was World War II surplus. Afterwards, when the Soviets began arming Cuba, the first ships arrived with the artillery they used against the Brigadistas. That’s why the Brigade leaders pressed Kennedy to act before March—before the shipments.

It’s interesting—and we can speculate—but had the operation gone ahead earlier, would they have been able to seize and hold? Even if they took the beachhead, Castro would still have called it Playa Girón as a triumph. For many historians listing the “battles of the 20th century,” Bay of Pigs is included—not because they won militarily, but for its world impact. That motivated me to write the book and keep the memory alive.

What’s interesting is the effect on the United States: the Cuban immigration—over the years maybe 1.5 to 2 million. It made Florida staunchly Republican. If Democrats hope to beat the evangelicals and the Cubans—well, it won’t happen. After the 2030 census, Florida is going to get three more congressional seats. It’s fascinating: there are Cubans everywhere. In Central America—I served in Guatemala and Mexico—Cubans everywhere. In Luxembourg, the Grand Duchess is Cuban. Venezuela too. It’s had an enormous effect on the U.S. in a way I can’t think of with any other immigration, because since the Bay of Pigs it has been focused against the president’s policy—indirectly blaming Democrats for what happened.

Another thing: I think Bay of Pigs was the first time the CIA entered the American public consciousness. They’d been around since 1947, with many covert actions. Eisenhower loved covert action—he loved it during WWII and continued in office. But I don’t think Americans realized there was this organization, essentially the president’s tool—and it has remained so. One question: I can’t understand why the operational element, led by Richard Bissell, never went to the analytical side of the Agency—Jack Smith was DDI at the time—and never posed simple questions like: How much support does Castro have? What are his military capabilities? I think they were still enamored of previous paramilitary successes.

From what I’ve read, they copy-pasted the Guatemala template—what worked in Guatemala should work here. But Cubans are not Guatemalans; the situation was different. Bissell is considered one of the great minds in the CIA. I think the original plan considered many factors, but after the site was canceled and rearranged in ten days, some things were inevitably overlooked. Maybe that’s where it failed. They also assumed Kennedy would ultimately aid the Brigade—something that didn’t happen.

Kennedy was misled in one way or another. But after planning for almost a year and a half, the CIA didn’t want to throw the plan away. They didn’t think much of Kennedy; they thought he was too immature to govern in the Cold War. Although the CIA was created under Truman—a Democrat—they were more aligned with Eisenhower’s politics.

Why do you think Cuba has remained such a focus of American policy when it’s basically just—well, not much, when you come down to it? Other than sugar cane—why? I get China, Brazil—but Cuba? Is it because of the Cubans? They’re brilliant—I've been around many Cubans in Guatemala and Mexico, and at headquarters. But I just don’t get it. Maybe you can tell me why this focus on a country that doesn’t…

I think it’s not just the Cubans. Cuba, as it is today, was the mastermind exporting communist thought across Latin America. They exported revolution. That’s why Che was in Bolivia. They sent advisors elsewhere. Colombia’s 50-plus years of conflict had a strong communist component. So Cuba’s importance is real.

Any other questions?

Anybody here from a Cuban family?

One interesting thing is credibility: Fidel’s first two military operations—the Moncada Barracks assault and the Granma landing—were disastrous. They were massacred, only a few survived, and then they built up an army and marched through Cuba. What the Girón victory established was credibility with the Russians—and in the developing world. To many, we (the U.S.) looked like the big monster. Before that, Fidel had little military credibility. He used some talented holdovers in military planning and used Soviet equipment, and his reputation soared. After the Missile Crisis, Kennedy gave a pledge not to invade; that guarantee, supposedly, and Soviet backing gave Cuba freedom to act on the world stage—in Africa, the developing world—and prominence in the Non-Aligned Movement. It was a launching pad. He was still young.

One of the things I investigated: I once spoke with Fidel Castro’s sister, who lived in Miami and owned a pharmacy. I couldn’t formally interview her, but we talked a bit. Castro married only once, though he had eight children with other women. His wife’s godfather at the wedding was Batista. Batista even paid for the honeymoon. They were connected—Spanish heritage, Havana’s elite.

Yes—both of Spanish heritage. His first wife was Mirta Díaz-Balart. If anyone knows Miami politics, the Díaz-Balart family is well known and aligned to the right. One of the NBC weekend newsreaders—José Díaz-Balart—is Fidel Castro’s nephew.

Yes.

Reading the news in Miami, yes. Families were divided. A lot of the Castros—well…

Fascinating story. Go ahead.

First of all, thank you for your presentation. It’s really nice. I believe Cuba is really important, especially for Latin American countries. Why? Because, for example, Colombia—years later you had all these Latin American figures throughout the region. It’s interesting to see Cuba as the left wing—Castro and Che—and its importance to South America. It wasn’t just guns; there were groups like Sendero Luminoso in Peru, movements in Ecuador, and the spark in Colombia. They set a high standard for other communist movements in Latin America.

Sorry—kind of unrelated—but you said there’s a difference between the Western name for the invasion and the Cuban name. Could you explain more?

It’s like how the Soviet Union called WWII “The Great Patriotic War,” while we call it “World War II.” Same war, different lens. In Cuba, they call their triumph Playa Girón, not “Bay of Pigs.” In the West, the first landings were at Playa Larga, so we talk about the Bay of Pigs. Different names depending on which side you’re on.

Fidel later invited some of them back for a reunion, didn’t he? A kind of reconciliation with one of the leaders—Duarte? They used to travel back to Cuba.

Yes—after about 40 years, in the early 2000s, some did go back.

Early 2000s, yes.

One thing the Brigadistas told me: they were in jail for about 21 months. During that time they became unified. Before that, everyone trained in different places and didn’t necessarily know each other. A battalion had around 183 people, so you didn’t know everyone. But in the same prison—Castillo del Príncipe, more or less—in the same cells for 21 months, you get to know everyone. They unified. That’s good in one sense and bad in another.

One thing they told me—and I tried to verify—is that when they landed, Castro knew exactly where they’d land because he had spies inside the Brigade. When I asked them, they always said, “No, no, no.” Then I pointed to Grayston Lynch’s book. They responded, “If it’s in the book, it’s correct.” So they didn’t say it directly, but they confirmed it.

If you recruit in Miami, and it’s very open, Castro will infiltrate people. He knew something was planned. Two weeks before the invasion, The New York Times had an article. In Cuba, the magazine Bohemia ran a full piece—even with training camp pictures. He just needed the exact place and got that information. That’s why he reacted so quickly. And remember: they were volunteers, not mercenaries—Che called them mercenaries—but they weren’t paid. They were trying to liberate their country based on their beliefs.

Thank you—this has been an amazing class. Do you see any similarities between what happened here and what is happening now in the seas off Venezuela? Has the U.S. learned something from this—is that why they haven’t entered Venezuela? What are they waiting for? Are they waiting for Venezuelans to solve it themselves before participating more actively—or…?

The United States has learned a lot since the 1960s. One thing they’ve learned: they don’t want boots on the ground. What’s happening now, in my perspective, is diplomacy—you move your pieces, you test, you try to get some response and some negotiation. You measure other countries’ responses. For example, if they bomb a drug-running boat and other countries don’t say anything, they might push further—but I don’t think they’ll put boots on the ground. If anything, it would be surgical strikes. In the first Trump administration and later, the pattern was surgical attacks, not invasions. I even included an image illustrating this.

And that’s why it works.

People want others to rise up and overthrow the government—but civilians don’t have weapons. They may have inspiration and will, but not weapons. If a government has repressed before, it will repress again. So I don’t think the solution will involve boots on the ground; it would have to be another way.

The thing I see at risk for the United States—now that they’re already there—something needs to happen because they can’t retreat at this point—or…

No—they can retreat.

They can retreat—but then with what being…?

Negotiation. If you get something—say, a promise. A promise doesn’t mean much, but if you get a promise, you can retreat for the moment. You manage the optics. Another approach is to present it as an exercise, not a threat. You’re doing an exercise and you also… In the end, if they want, they can retreat.

Alright. Thank you all very much—and thank you. That’s been fascinating. I look forward to meeting you. I hope you get the movie—and I have a part in the movie.

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